INTERIOR Minister Mohsin Naqvi’s proposal for more provinces wasn’t the first time someone close to the establishment made the suggestion. However, this time a stated motivation was also provided: namely, the complete collapse of the existing governance system. While much has been written about this issue, it has largely been theoretical and speculative, with the closest real-world examples coming from other countries. The problem with those examples is that, while informative, they mostly exist in a context very different to Pakistan’s, making it difficult to draw parallels. But an example closer to home can help us predict better. The last time Pakistan’s internal borders were redrawn was in 2018 with Fata’s merger with KP through the 25th Amendment.

A similarly stated motivation for the merger was given at the time — the utter collapse of the old Fata governance system. That system has been blamed for the militant takeover in many parts of Fata (now called the merged districts). Many also hold it responsible for erstwhile Fata’s extremely poor human development indices compared to the Pakistani average. The merger with KP, and thus the extension of KP’s institutional structures, laws, and systems, was deemed necessary to resolve Fata’s problems. Another proclaimed benefit was that the merger would bring the government closer to the public. The state believed that the militants had filled the void created by an unresponsive government. So, in many ways, the motivation to merge rested on two beliefs: first, to replace an old, collapsed system with one offering better governance; and second, to involve communities in decision-making by bringing government closer to them. Similar justifications are now being touted to support the idea of new provinces.

Eight years after the merger, the question is: how effectively has the change improved both aspects for residents of the merged areas? The question of whether decision-making has been brought closer to the people and thereby made government institutions more responsive to the public’s needs is perhaps the easier one to answer: there’s no evidence that matters have improved; if anything, the opposite appears to be true. The merged areas still have no share in the NFC and continue to depend on discretionary federal funding. In fact, they are a step removed from that planning process, as it must come through KP rather than directly to them. Similarly, the tribal system is, by definition, participatory and community-led. Replacing it with a more centralised, institutional state structure has decreased community involvement and the power of the local people to run their own affairs.

The question of governance is more complex, but even here, there is not much improvement. First, the new system is less participatory even in governance, further alienating people from their government. Second, the administrative system is now far too bureaucratic to respond promptly. It is increasingly bloated — current administrative expenditures for the merged areas have more than doubled, from about Rs50 billion at the time of the merger to over Rs100bn now. Similarly, the judicial process, like elsewhere in the country, is painfully slow, making locals increasingly likely to turn to traditional jirgas rather than the courts. The creation of alternative dispute resolution me­­chanisms and dispute resolution councils, aligned with traditional jirgas and under the guise of the district administration and district police respectively, acknowledges the delay in dispensing justice. Worse, there has been no marked improvement in any human development indicator; apart from isolated instances, no real examples of systemic improvement in service delivery exist. Where security is concerned, there is a surge in militant activity in the region, with terrorist incidents and casualty figures worse than in the years before the merger. Clearly, the merger is not preventing the resurgence of militancy in the area.

What insights does the Fata merger offer into the recently proposed move to create new administrative units?

The merger failed to achieve the improvements that proponents vowed it would bring, even though it had backing at the national level, unlike the idea of new provinces, especially from the three major national political parties (the PML-N, PTI and PPP), establishment experts and development partners. It was a rare moment in Pakistan’s recent political history in which all three major national parties came together to pass the 25th Constitutional Amendment and then saw it passed in the KP Assembly by consensus. The idea of new provinces has no such national consensus at the moment; it would look more like arm-twisting if the political parties go ahead with it. However, even in the case of the merger, locals were excluded from the decision-making process, and a majority of Fata’s elected parliamentarians at the time favoured reforms, though they raised serious reservations about how these reforms were being pursued. This was cause for concern. Regrettably, their alarm was disregarded; in fact, it was termed a vain effort by locals to save an archaic system.

One might argue that the merger was, in many ways, a different reform than creating new provinces. Yet both reforms ignore the same basic issue of structure and approach, which must be addressed before there is any redrawing of internal provincial borders or creation of new administrative units. To have a responsive government, communities need more involvement through a regularly functioning, well-resourced local government system. Helping communities decide the policies they want is essential for a successful transition to new systems. Whether this happens in a larger administrative unit or a smaller one matters less.

Most importantly, Pakistan needs a mindset shift in how it pursues policy and reforms. We need an approach that replaces preconceived notions and unsubstantiated beliefs that dictate policy. We must move away from a mindset that envisions the state as a mere administrative entity; instead, the state must assume the role of a citizen-empowering force that serves the people. Without this, even the most logical ‘reforms’ will prove cosmetic and do little to address systemic failures.

The writer is a development practitioner and a former parliamentarian.

X: @GhaziGJ

Published in Dawn, September 18th, 2026